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How May I Serve You? Service of Process
by Mail Under the Hague Convention on
the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters
I. Introduction
Commensurate with the increased trade between the United
States and other countries has been an increase in transnational
litigation.' The Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters
(the "Convention"), 2 has greatly facilitated the process by which
an American plaintiff may commence suit against a foreign de-
fendant. 3 The Convention sets in place uniform methods for ef-
fecting service upon foreign defendants whose countries are sig-
natories to the Convention;4 no longer does the American
attorney have to engage in an exhaustive exploration of a foreign
country's civil procedure in his quest to ensure effective ser-
vice - or does he?
This Note discusses the Convention in the context of oppos-
ing decisions rendered by the Second and Eighth Circuits on
whether the Convention, by its express terms, permits direct ser-
vice of process by mail.' This issue has been extensively litigated
over the past decade in the United States.6 No conclusive inter-
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 471
introductory note (1986).
2. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361,
658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Convention].
3. Historically, an American plaintiff seeking to commence such a suit had to ensure
that service of process complied with the internal law of the foreign state.
4. Convention, supra note 2, arts. 2-10.
5. The Second Circuit held that the Convention permits direct service of process by
mail; see infra notes 46-74 and accompanying text. The Eighth Circuit, however, held
that the Convention does not permit direct service of process by mail; see infra notes 75-
92 and accompanying text.
6. Four of the twelve federal judicial circuits, the first, third, sixth, and tenth, have
1
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pretation has been rendered. This Note attempts to resolve the
conflict between the circuits and suggests a final resolution of
the controversy.
Part II of this Note discusses the genesis of the Convention,
the Convention itself, and the appropriate framework within
which to interpret the Convention. Part III discusses the proce-
dural history and decisions of the Second and Eighth Circuit
cases. Part IV analyzes the interpretative approaches employed
by the courts in light of: (1) the Convention's language;7 (2) Spe-
cial Commission reports;8 (3) documents produced by the Per-
manent Bureau;" (4) internal law;10 and (5) the Convention's ne-
gotiating history." Part V concludes that if the efficacy of the
Convention is to be maintained, signatory nations must agree to
abide by a liberal interpretation of its provisions.
II. Background
A. Genesis of the Convention
The Convention was adopted at the tenth session of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law (the "Confer-
ence"), 2 an association of independent nations whose primary
not had occasion to address the issue of whether the Convention permits direct service of
process by mail. Two of the eight circuits that have addressed the issue, the second and
eighth, have dealt with it at the court of appeals level and their decisions are the subject
of this Note. See supra note 5. Of the remaining six circuits, district courts from the
fourth, seventh, and the District of Columbia, have held that the Convention does per-
mit direct service of process by mail. See Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194 (N.D. Ill.
1985); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984); Weight
v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 597 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D. Va. 1984). The Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits conflict at the district court level on whether the Convention permits
service of process by mail. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F.
Supp. 847, 850-51 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (service of process by mail comports with the Con-
vention) with Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464, 466 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (service
of process by mail does not comport with the Convention).
7. See infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 111-17, 138-42 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
12. The first session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law was held
in The Netherlands in 1893. In 1952 it was established as a permanent institution by a
multilateral convention. James C. Dezendorf, The Ninth Session of the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law, 47 A.B.A.J. 909 (1961).
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objective is the unification of conflict of laws rules.1 3 Located in
the Netherlands, the Conference is staffed by a permanent bu-
reau that operates under the supervision of a standing commis-
sion of the Netherlands government." The bureau and commis-
sion work together on the agenda for the quadrennial sessions
and handle various administrative matters including the prepa-
ration of questionnaires to member nations on forthcoming top-
ics.15 Special commissions made up of representatives of the
member nations convene between sessions to prepare drafts of
proposed conventions. 6 These drafts are forwarded to all mem-
ber nations for their observations. Responses to the drafts are
then distributed at the sessions of the Conference.'" For each
session, member nations send representatives from their coun-
tries including judges, legal scholars, legal advisers and experts
on conflicts of laws.' 8
B. The Convention
The Convention was designed to update the 1905 and 1954
conventions on international civil procedure.' 9 Its dual purpose
is to simplify and expedite the procedure for service of process
by plaintiffs in one state upon defendants in another, and to en-
sure that such defendants receive notice of proceedings against
them in time to appear or otherwise respond."0
The Convention regulates numerous aspects of the service
13. Willis L. M. Reese, The Ninth Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 447, 448 (1961).
14. Id.
15. Philip W. Amram, Report on the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 87, 88 (1965).
16. Willis L. M. Reese, The Ninth Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 447, 448 (1961). Special commissions also meet to
discuss the operation of various treaties in practice. In 1977 and 1989, special commis-
sions met to discuss the operation of the Convention; see infra notes 111-17 and 138-42
and accompanying text.
17. Kurt H. Nadelmann, The United States at the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 618, 619 (1957).
18. Id.
19. Kurt H. Nadelmann & Willis L. M. Reese, The Tenth Session of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, 13 AM. J. CoMP. L. 612, 613 (1964). The earlier
conventions were ratified by numerous countries but not the United States. Id. The
United States became a member of the Conference in 1964. Id. at 612.




procedure. It permits methods of service, other than those pro-
vided for under the Convention, that are sanctioned by a receiv-
ing state's internal law.2 1 It proscribes a signatory state from ob-
jecting to a mode of service that satisfies the terms of the
Convention, unless the state would deem compliance with the
same an infringement of its sovereignty or security. 22 It limits
the right of a state to enter a default judgment against a nonap-
pearing defendant and grants a state broad discretion to open
such a judgment.2 3 The Convention mandates that each state, at
the time of ratification or accession: (1) designate all prescribed
Central Authorities - agencies established by each member na-
tion to receive and serve documents forwarded by other member
nations; (2) state its opposition, if any, to the service methods
provided for under the Convention, other than service through
the Central Authority; and (3) declare any stipulations with re-
spect to the entry of, or relief from, a default judgment.24
The Convention is applicable to all civil and commercial
cases and provides for three basic methods of service2 5 The
most formal method is through the Central Authority.26 Service
through the Central Authority requires the sender to transmit
not only the summons and complaint, but also completed speci-
fied forms - a service request form and a form summarizing
the document to be served. 7 Having received the appropriate
forms, each Central Authority may effect service in accordance
with its country's internal law or by a method requested by the
sender, provided such method conforms with internal law. 28 De-
livery to an addressee who accepts it voluntarily would be an
example of such a method. 9 Upon effecting service, the Central
Authority completes a certificate stating that the document was
served, how and upon whom service was made, and the date and
place of such service." This certificate is then forwarded directly
21. Id. art. 19.
22. Id. art. 13.
23. Id. arts. 15, 16.
24. Id. arts. 2, 21.
25. Id. arts. 1, 6-10.
26. Id. art. 2.
27. Id. art. 3.
28. Id. art. 5.
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 6.
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to the individual who requested service.3
The second method allows service to be effected directly
through diplomatic or consular agents, judicial officers, officials
or other competent persons, provided the receiving state has not
objected.2 Finally, the least formal but most questionable
method of service, and the one that is the subject of this Note, is
that designated under article 10(a), which permits judicial docu-
ments to be sent directly through the mail, provided the receiv-
ing state has not objected. 33
C. Interpretation of the Convention
The Convention is a multilateral treaty, binding on all sig-
natories and, as with any contract, legal rules of construction ap-
ply.34 The principal authority guiding the interpretation of trea-
ties is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a
multilateral convention governing all aspects of treaties from the
capacity of states to enter into them to the consequences ema-
nating from their breach.3 5 The articles pertaining to the inter-
pretation of treaties were adopted without a dissenting vote3 1
31. Id.
32. Id. arts. 8, 9, 10(b), (c). Article 8 provides that "[ejach contracting State shall be
free to effect service of judicial documents upon persons abroad, without application of
any compulsion, directly through its diplomatic or consular agents. Any State may de-
clare that it is opposed to such service within its territory .... Id. art. 8.
33. Id. art. 10. Article 10 states:
Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention
shall not interfere with -
(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to
persons abroad,
(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the
State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial
officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination,
(c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect ser-
vice of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other
competent persons of the State of destination.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("A treaty is primarily a con-
tract between two or more independent nations .... ").
35. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 883-87 (1969) [hereinafter
the Vienna Convention].
36. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES, A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 219 (1970) (article 31 was adopted by 97 votes to none, and
article 32 by 101 votes to none).
5
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and have thus been construed as declaratory of existing, custom-
ary international law - binding on all states, regardless of
whether they are signatories to the Vienna Convention.37
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention outline the
pertinent rules of construction. Article 31 provides that a treaty
is to be interpreted in good faith, S and in accordance with the
ordinary, contextual meaning of its terms in light of the treaty's
object and purpose.39 This is the overall governing principle. 0 In
addition, article 31 states that a special meaning shall be applied
to a term if it can be demonstrated that the parties so
intended."1
Article 32 provides that recourse to supplementary sources
of interpretation, including preparatory work, is permissible to
confirm the meaning that results from applying article 31, to
clarify an ambiguous, obscure, absurd or unreasonable meaning
resulting from its application, or to avoid an application that
leads to an absurd or unreasonable result.42 Sources that aid in
37. E. Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159
R.C.A.D.I. 42 (1978-I) ("Legal rules concerning the interpretation of treaties constitute
one of the Sections of the Vienna Convention which were adopted without a dissenting
vote at the Conference and consequently may be considered as declaratory of existing
law.").. Existing law in this context refers to customary international law that results
from a general and concordant practice followed by states under the belief that they are
legally bound to do so. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1986).
38. Good faith has been construed to imply the requirement to remain faithful to
the intention of the parties without defeating it by a literal interpretation or destroying
the object and purpose of the treaty. Report of the International Law Commission to
the General Assembly on the Work of the Second Part of its 17th Session, U.N. Doc. A/
6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 210-11, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 (Part I).
39. Vienna Convention, supra note 35. Context includes: (1) the treaty's preamble;
(2) annexes; (3) agreements relating to the treaty reached among all the parties, or
among some of the parties but accepted by all, in connection with the treaty's conclu-
sion; (4) follow-up agreements among the parties regarding the treaty's interpretation or
application; and (5) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
among the parties. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 31.
40. Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, the Su-
preme Court has adhered to this principle in interpreting treaties. See Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988). In Schlunk, the Court was called
upon to construe the legal sufficiency of service under the Convention. It noted that the
starting point for interpreting a treaty is the language of the treaty itself and the context
within which the words were written. Id. at 699, 700.
41. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 31.
42. Id. art. 32. Similarly, the Supreme Court has adopted this construction of trea-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/5
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the interpretation of the Hague Convention include: the Con-
vention itself, declarations made by the states at the time of ac-
cession or ratification,43 a Practical Handbook," and two Special
Commission Reports emanating from meetings held in 1977 and
1989."5 These sources will be examined to determine the in-
tended meaning of article 10(a). The ramifications of overlook-
ing such sources are illustrated by the decisions of the Second
and Eighth Circuits.
III. Cases
A. The Second Circuit Case
Ackermann v. Levine involved a contract dispute between a
West German law firm and an American client.40 The action was
commenced by Ackermann and other partners of his firm to en-
force a default judgment entered against the defendant, Levine,
by a German court.' 7 The underlying German suit was an action
for attorneys' fees for services allegedly rendered by Ackermann
to Levine in connection with Levine's attempted sale of a New
Jersey real estate project to a West German purchaser. 8
1. The German Action
Suit was commenced in the Regional Court of West Berlin
which, pursuant to articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, for-
warded the summons and complaint by registered mail to the
Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany in New
York for service upon Levine at his New Jersey business ad-
ties. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699, 700 ("[To ascertain [the] meaning [of a treaty] we may
look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the
practical construction adopted by the parties") (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392, 396 (1985)).
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
44. PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 No-
VEMBER 1965 ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN
CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS (HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW)
(1983) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
45. 17 I.L.M. 319 (1978) [hereinafter FIRST SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORT] and 28
I.L.M. 1556 (1989) [hereinafter SECOND SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORT]. See infra notes
111-17 and 138-42 and accompanying text.
46. Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
47. Id. at 833.




dress.4 9 Although the Consulate forwarded the documents by
registered mail to the specified address and received acknowl-
edgment of their delivery, Levine claimed he did not receive
them." Approximately six months later, the Regional Court,
again pursuant to articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, sent the
summons and complaint to the Consulate with a request that
the documents be served on Levine at his home address, an
apartment complex in New York City.5 1 The Consulate for-
warded the documents by registered mail to the apartment com-
plex where they were received by an employee who subsequently
delivered them to Levine. 2 Levine acknowledged their receipt
but failed to enter an appearance or otherwise defend the suit.53
Judgment was subsequently entered against him."4 He received
notice of the judgment prior to expiration of the appeal period,
but took no action.55
2. The United States District Court Action
More than a year after the judgment rendered by the Ger-
man court had become final, plaintiffs sought enforcement in the
United States by commencing suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York.5 6 Levine appeared, contesting,
among other things, the adequacy of service of process in the
German action.5 7 Levine claimed that service by registered mail
on an employee in his apartment complex was improper under
the Convention. 58 It was plaintiffs' position that service was au-
49. Id. at 837-39. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.






56. Ackermann v. Levine, 610 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
57. Defendant also alleged that (i) service by registered mail violated constitutional
due process, (ii) the German court lacked in personam jurisdiction, (iii) the judgment
had been fraudulently obtained, and (iv) enforcement of the judgment would violate
public policy. Joint Appendix at 48, Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986)
(No. 85-7553). The focus of this article is the service of process issue; accordingly, these
issues will not be addressed.
58. Ackermann, 610 F. Supp. at 643. Levine also claimed service was improper
under German law. However, the district court held that service by registered mail upon
defendants located abroad was permissible under German law. Id. at 645-46.
[Vol. 12:177
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thorized under articles 8 and 10 of the Convention."6 The United
States had not registered any objection to either article; there-
fore, plaintiffs argued, article 8 authorized service through the
German Consulate in New York, and article 10(a) authorized
service by registered mail."
The district court held that article 10 of the Convention did
not authorize modes of service independent of those prescribed
for the Central Authorities under article 5.11 Accordingly, when
a party chose to effect service through a channel other than a
Central Authority, such service had to comply with that availa-
ble to the Central Authorities - by a method sanctioned by the
receiving state's internal law." The court noted that because
service by registered mail was not then permitted under either
New York State or federal law, it was defective; therefore, the
German judgment could not be enforced. 3
3. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
Plaintiffs appealed, inter alia, the district court's holding
that service of process by registered mail violated the Conven-
tion. 4 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that contrary to the
district court's determination, article 8 combined with article 10
provided a valid alternative method for effecting service under
the Convention - service through a consulate was proper
under article 8 and subsequent mailing by the consulate to the
defendant was proper under article 10(a).6 5 Addressing the
meaning of the word "send" as used in article 10(a), the court
noted that the leading commentator on the Convention, Bruno
Ristau,66 had reached the "inescapable" conclusion that the
59. Id. at 643. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
60. Ackermann, 610 F. Supp. at 643.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 643-44.
64. Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs also appealed
the district court's holdings that service of process by registered mail violated constitu-
tional due process and that enforcement of the judgment would violate New York's pub-
lic policy. Id.
65. Id.
66. Mr. Ristau is the author of INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COM-
MERCIAL) (1984), a two-volume treatise on international judicial assistance including ser-




draftsmen of the Convention intended the word "send" to en-
compass service of process rather than mere mailing of docu-
ments for informational purposes and that the use of the word
"send" was careless. 7 In addition, the court endorsed the rea-
soning of a California state court which held that the inclusion
of article 10(a) in the Convention would be superfluous unless it
was intended to provide for service of process by mail.6 8 Fur-
thermore, the court reasoned that because article 10(a) had been
successfully used by American plaintiffs to effect service on for-
eign defendants in states that had not objected to such service,
it "would undermine the Hague Convention's purpose of unify-
ing the rules of service of process abroad" to invalidate such ser-
vice when effected against an American defendant. 9
The court reversed the district court's holding that service
of process was ineffective because it failed to satisfy both federal
and state civil procedure rules.70 With respect to satisfying New
York State's civil procedure rules, the court held that federal
laws and treaties preempt inconsistent state law.71 Accordingly,
service of process did not have to satisfy state law.72 With re-
spect to whether service had to satisfy federal civil procedure
rules, the court noted that in ratifying the treaty, the United
States had in no manner qualified its acceptance of mail ser-
vice,73 therefore, the Convention supplemented federal law on
67. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 839. The Rapporteur's report on article 10(a) of the
draft convention provides in part: "The provision of paragraph 1 [labelled '(a)' in the
final text] also permits service by telegram if the state where service is to be made does
not object. The Commission did not accept the proposal that postal channels be limited
to registered mail." Translated from 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA DIXIEME SESSION
(CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE) 90 (1964) [hereinafter 3 ACTES
ET DOCUMENTS].
68. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 839 (citing Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court of San
Francisco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)). The court explicitly noted that by
adopting this construction, it was rejecting the interpretation of two New York state
courts that had held that "send" as used in article 10(a) did not include service of pro-
cess. Id. at 839 n.11.
69. Id. at 840.
70. Id.
71. Id. (Construction in accord with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution ... and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby .....
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this issue."'
B. The Eighth Circuit Case
Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corporation involved a products
liability claim by an American plaintiff against a Japanese auto-
mobile manufacturer, Toyota Motor Corporation ("Toyota").7 5
1. The United States District Court Action
Plaintiffs first attempted service of process within the
United States by mailing the summons and complaint by regular
mail to an affiliated corporation in California, Toyota's pur-
ported agent.76 Toyota filed a motion to dismiss, claiming service
of process was not in compliance with the Convention to which
both Japan and the United States are signatories. 7 Toyota
claimed that under the Convention, service of process by regular
mail within the United States was impermissible and that the
Convention required plaintiffs to effect service through Japan's
designated Central Authority. 78 The District Court for the West-
ern District of Arkansas denied the motion and granted plain-
tiffs forty-five days to comply with service under the
Convention.79
Plaintiffs then mailed the summons and complaint by regis-
tered mail to Toyota in Japan and received a return acknowl-
edgment evidencing receipt.80 Toyota, however, renewed its mo-
tion to dismiss, claiming that plaintiffs' mode of service still did
not comply with the Convention because it violated Japanese
At the time of ratification of the Convention, the United States did not require that
mail service comply with the federal rules of civil procedure regarding mail service.
HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 130.
74. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 840. In addition, the court declared that "where the
Convention provides a rule of decision, that rule is dispositive, barring any contrary dec-
laration by the United States; where the Convention is silent, federal law should govern
where possible." Id.
75. Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989).
76. Joint Appendix at 13, Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172 (8th Cir.
1989) (No. 89-1249WA) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
77. Id. at 13-14.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id. at 18-25.
1992]
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law."1 In addition, Toyota claimed that "send" as used in article
10(a) of the Convention did not mean service of process.' Plain-
tiffs, however, alleged that the word "send" was the equivalent
of "serve," and, therefore, article 10(a) did authorize mail
service.8 3
The district court held that direct service of process by mail
was not addressed by the Convention.8 ' The court reasoned that
given the deliberation which attends the negotiation and draft-
ing of treaties, it would be inconceivable for the drafters of the
Convention to have used the word "send" in article 10(a) to
mean service of process, when they had used the word "service"
in other sections of the treaty8 5 - expressio unius est exclusio
alterius8 6 The court concluded that article 10(a) merely pro-
vided a method for sending follow-up documents after service of
process had been obtained through the Central Authority.8 7 Ac-
cordingly, service had to be effected through this medium.88
Upon plaintiffs' motion, the court certified the question regard-
ing the meaning of article 10(a) for interlocutory appeal to the
circuit court of appeals.8 9
81. Id. at 26 (Toyota claimed that in order to use mail service of process, the Con-
vention, by its express terms, required that such service be permitted under the law of
the receiving state).
82. Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 123 F.R.D. 595, 597 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 599.
85. Id.
86. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979)(to use one is to exclude the other).
87. Bankston, 123 F.R.D. at 599. In this regard, the court was endorsing the inter-
pretation given article 10(a) of the Convention by E. Charles Routh (member of the firm
of Houger, Garvey and Schubert in Seattle, and resident attorney from that firm with
the Matsuo Law Office in Tokyo from 1973 to 1975). CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING
BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA xiv (John 0. Haley, ed., A.B.A. 1978). Mr. Routh's
belief that article 10(a) did not permit service of process by mail was based on his con-
clusion that to interpret article 10(a) as permitting such service would lead to "a rather
illogical result, as the Convention sets up a rather cumbersome and involved procedure
for service of process [service through the Central Authority]; and if [article 10(a)] al-
lowed one to circumvent the procedure by simply sending something through the mail,
the vast bulk of the Convention would be useless." Id. at 190-91.
88. Bankston, 123 F.R.D. at 599.
89. Joint Appendix, supra note 76, at 41-42.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/5
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2. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
reasoning and holding of the district court.9 0 In addition, how-
ever, the court adopted the reasoning of a California state court
which had held that because direct service of process by regis-
tered mail was not permitted within Japan under Japanese law,
it was unlikely that Japan intended to sanction the use of this
method under the Convention.91 Japan's failure to object to arti-
cle 10(a) when it had objected to the more formal modes of ser-
vice under articles 10(b) and (c) (service by judicial officers or
officials of the receiving state) evidenced Japan's belief that arti-
cle 10(a) did not authorize mail service.92
IV. Analysis
An early commentator on the Convention, noting its lack of
clarity, expressed the hope that "in interpreting the Convention
the courts will go beyond narrow, overly-literal interpretations
in order to forward its spirit and objectives." 93 The past decade
of cases litigating the interpretation of the word "send," as used
in article 10(a) of the Convention, epitomizes the failure of the
courts to consistently pursue this ideal.9 '
The Second and Eighth Circuit decisions are representative
of the two primary but divergent analytical frameworks federal
courts have employed in this interpretative process. 5 As a start-
ing point, both courts appropriately relied on the language of
the Convention. 6 The first point of departure occurred with re-
spect to the tools each court implemented in interpreting the
language of the Convention. The Second Circuit relied on the
Convention's purpose and negotiating history97 while the Eighth
90. Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1989).
91. Id. at 174 (citing Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court of San Bernardino, 249
Cal. Rptr. 376 (1988)).
92. Id.
93. Stephen F. Downs, The Effect of the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extra judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 125, 141-42 (1968).
94. See supra note 6.
95. Id.
96. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 839; Bankston, 889 F.2d at 174.




Circuit looked to canons of statutory construction." A second
point of departure occurred with respect to the role each court
accorded internal law in the interpretative process. The Second
Circuit believed that reference to internal law was appropriate
only when the Convention was silent, 9 while the Eighth Circuit
relied on internal law to support its conclusion that service of
process by mail was not a permissible mode of service under the
Convention.'"0
Although the Second Circuit's approach produced an out-
come more consonant with the Convention's purpose, the result
was largely fortuitous because it stemmed from mere logic rather
than a seasoned knowledge, understanding and application of in-
ternational law principles of treaty interpretation. It is unfortu-
nate that neither court explicitly recognized the nature .of the
document whose language they sought to construe.
A. The Convention, Preamble and Annexes
The starting point for interpreting a treaty is the language
of the treaty itself.1°0 The preamble to the Convention states a
twofold purpose: (1) to create appropriate means to ensure that
judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad are
brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time; and (2)
to improve the organization of mutual judicial assistance for
that purpose by simplifying and expediting the procedure. 102 Ar-
guably, service of process through the mail most effectively
achieves these purposes. The inclusion of a provision in the Con-
vention barring entry of a default judgment when a plaintiff
cannot demonstrate that the defendant received service"'3 sup-
ports the inference that the drafters of the Convention intended
article 10(a) to authorize service of process through the mail.
Nevertheless, as the decisions of the Second and Eighth Circuits
attest, conclusions based on logical inferences can differ. It was
the position of the Second Circuit that the inclusion of article
98. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
102. Convention, supra note 2, preamble.
103. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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10(a) in the Convention would have been superfluous unless it
was intended to mean "service.' 0 4 However, the Eighth Circuit
held that article 10(a) provided a method for sending subse-
quent documents after service of process had been obtained by
means of an alternative method under the Convention." The
language of article 10 clouds rather than clarifies the issue be-
cause provisions (b) and (c) of article 10 specifically use the
word "service," yet (a) does not.'06 The Second Circuit attrib-
uted this disparity to "careless drafting,"'1 7 whereas the Eighth
Circuit held that the discrepancy was the result of conscious
deliberation. 0 8
Other provisions of the Convention can provide insight on
this divergence of opinion. Article 21 requires each contracting
state, at the time of its ratification or accession to the Conven-
tion, to notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
of any opposition it may have to the methods of transmission
under article 10.'09 Accordingly, in ratifying the treaty, several
states have stated their objection to article 10(a)." 0 An applica-
tion of the Eighth Circuit's holding that article 10(a) only per-
mits a plaintiff to mail follow-up documents after effecting ser-
vice by other means, would result in the prohibition of such
follow-up mailings by those states that have objected to article
10(a). In other words, a defendant-national of an objecting state
cannot be kept apprised of the status of proceedings against him
in a foreign tribunal by means of the mails. It is unlikely that
these signatory states intended such a harsh result against their
own nationals. Applying the Second Circuit's holding leads to a
much more rational outcome. If article 10(a) is interpreted to
include mail service, then those states that have objected to arti-
cle 10(a) are only proscribing service of process by mail and not
the.mailing of any follow-up documents. This construction of ar-
104. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
106. Convention, supra note 2, art. 10.
107. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
109. Convention, supra note 2, art. 21.
110. Among the states that have objected outright to article 10(a) are Czechoslova-
kia, Germany, Norway, and Turkey. HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 97, 106, 118, 126. Ja-




ticle 10(a) is consistent with that adopted by the Special Com-
mission at a meeting in the Hague in November, 1977.11
B. The 1977 Special Commission Meeting
The purpose of the Special Commission meeting was to dis-
cuss the practical operation of the Convention.112 The meeting
was attended by experts from eleven of the then nineteen states
that were parties to the Convention, including representatives
from the United States and Japan.113 German representatives
also attended as non-parties." 4 The experts oversaw the practi-
cal application of the Convention in their respective states."5
Following the meeting, the Permanent Bureau prepared a report
summarizing the discussions of the eight-day conference. With
respect to service by means of postal channels, the Permanent
Bureau specifically noted:
The States which object to the utilisation [sic] of service by post
sent from abroad are known thanks to the declarations made to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.""
It was determined that most of the States made no objection to
the service of judicial documents coming from abroad directly by
mail in their territory.' 17
These statements are an explicit recognition that the decla-
rations made by states with respect to article 10(a) refer to ser-
vice of process through postal channels as opposed to the mail-
ing of follow-up documents. Unfortunately, neither the Second
nor Eighth Circuits cited this report in their decisions; however,
they did refer to a Handbook prepared by the Permanent Bu-
reau that outlines states' objections to methods of service made
pursuant to article 21.118





116. Id. at 329.
117. Id. at 326.
118. HANDBOOK, supra note 44.
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C. The Handbook
As its name implies, the Handbook is intended to serve as a
guide to service of process under the Convention." 9 It was pro-
duced in close cooperation with participating states and the Per-
manent Bureau, and was initially forwarded to the competent
authorities of these states for their comments and criticism. 1' 0
Part Three of the Handbook covers methods of service of pro-
cess other than service through a Central Authority: service
through consular or diplomatic channels, through the post,
through process servers or through other channels.'"' The sec-
tion is organized by country and covers the various channels of
transmission and the states' qualifications.' With respect to Ja-
pan's comments on article 10(a), the section states: "Japan has
not declared that it objects to service through postal chan-
nels.' 3 Similarly, with respect to the United States' comments
on article 10(a), the section states: "The United States do [sic]
not object to the utilization of postal channels by foreign author-
ities for the purpose of service on an addressee in the United
States."'2 " In view of these statements, it is difficult to compre-
hend how the Eighth Circuit could have concluded that article
10(a) does not authorize mail service. A ready explanation,
which reveals the key to this apparent enigma, can be found in a
careful reading of the case: the court's reliance on internal law.
D. The Role of Internal Law
Before critiquing each court's treatment of internal law, it is
important to identify the role that internal law plays in the con-
text of international law and treaties.
A long-standing principle of international law is that a state
cannot interpose its internal law as justification for noncompli-
ance with, or nonrecognition of, international obligations.'25
119. The idea to produce the Handbook to facilitate service of process had its ori-
gins in the 1977 Special Commission meeting. HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at V.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 92-131.
123. Id. at 112.
124. Id. at 130.
125. During the first session of the International Law Commission in 1949, the fol-




Under the Vienna Convention, internal law has no role in treaty
interpretation; only when a treaty specifically incorporates inter-
nal law in a particular provision is such reliance appropriate. 2 6
Article 10(a) makes no reference to internal law. 2 7 Accordingly,
the Eighth Circuit's reliance on Japan's internal law to support
its conclusion that service by mail is impermissible under the
Convention is misplaced. What Japanese law authorizes or pros-
cribes is immaterial. In this regard, the Second Circuit correctly
stated the role of the United States' internal procedural law:
[W]hether ... service satisfied Rule 4 [federal rule governing ser-
vice of process] as it then existed or as it now exists is irrelevant
because the United States has made no declaration or limitation
to its ratification of the Convention regarding Federal Rule 4, or
Article 10(a) of the Convention or otherwise regarding mail ser-
vice under the Convention. 2 '
The point is, in ratifying or acceding to the treaty, states
had express authority to declare reservations with respect to ar-
ticle 10. Japan did not limit its acceptance of article 10(a). For a
court to qualify or redefine sua sponte a state's reservations is
entirely inappropriate. In effect, the Eighth Circuit applied a
double standard by clinging to a plain language construction of
the Convention itself but unwittingly abandoning this principle
in construing Japan's reservations. Instead, the court preferred
to probe behind the plain language of the reservations to sup-
port its conclusion that "it was 'extremely unlikely' that Japan's
failure to object to article 10(a) was intended to authorize the
use of registered mail as an effective mode of service of process.
"..,129 In light of the deference this conclusion accords the pos-
sible construction the Japanese government may give to the
Convention, it is appropriate to examine the Convention's
"Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law and it may not invoke limitations contained in its
own Constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty." Summary
Records of the 14th Meeting, [1949] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 105, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1949.
126. Vienna Convention, supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 33.
128. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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travaux pr~paratoires"0l to determine whether during the Con-
vention's negotiation, Japanese representatives were unclear as
to the true meaning of article 10(a).
E. The Travaux Pr~paratoires
It is both significant and unfortunate that neither counsel
nor the courts in the Second and Eighth Circuit cases referenced
the negotiations of the Convention's drafting committee. A cur-
sory examination of the negotiation transcript, contained in the
travaux pr~paratoires, would have immediately clarified the
ambiguity posited by article 10(a).13' Article 10(a) does author-
ize service of process by mail.
Both the 1905 and 1954 conventions on civil procedure per-
mitted service of process by mail. 32 With regard to the 1964
Convention, the German expert in particular, opposed the incor-
poration of this mode of service; the reasons proffered were sov-
ereignty and public order.' 33 Notwithstanding these objections,
many experts supported its incorporation because of the simplic-
ity and speed by which service could be effected using this
method. 134 Consequently, service of process by mail was incorpo-
rated in the final draft. 35
During oral deliberations on the final draft, the German
delegate proposed to limit the use of postal channels to those
instances where a state expressly consented to its use; however,
the proposal was defeated. 36 The final text permits the use of
postal channels unless a state expressly objects. 3 7 Japan did not
object, and therefore, it would seem reasonable to conclude that
service of process by mail is permissible by foreign plaintiffs
upon Japanese defendants. In spite of the language of the final
130. Travaux pr~paratoires are the documents containing the negotiating history of
a treaty.
131. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
132. 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 67, at 82.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 83.
135. Id. at 90. The drafting committee specifically refused to limit postal channels
to registered mail and furthermore, encompassed within the purview of postal channels
service of process by telegram! Id.





text, Japan's position remains unclear in light of a statement by
its representative at the 1989 Special Commission meeting.138
F. The 1989 Special Commission Meeting
In 1989, a Special Commission again convened in the Hague
to discuss the Convention. '39 The issue of the interpretation of
article 10(a) arose, and it was noted:
[T]he postal channel for service constitutes a method which is
quite separate from service via the Central Authorities or between
judicial officers. Article 10 a [sic] in effect offered a reservation to
Contracting States to consider that service by mail was an in-
fringement of their sovereignty. Thus, theoretical doubts about
the legal nature of the procedure were unjustified. Nonetheless,
certain courts in the United States of America ... had concluded
that service of process abroad by mail was not permitted under
the Convention. 4 0
This statement conclusively puts to rest the controversy
surrounding the interpretation of article 10(a). Article 10(a) does
provide for service of process by mail. However, in view of the
following statement by the Japanese delegation at the meeting
of the Special Commission, article 10(a) may still pose some
problems:
Japan has not declared that it objects to the sending of judicial
documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad. In this
connection, Japan has made it clear that no objection to the use
of postal channels for sending judicial documents to persons in
Japan does not necessarily imply that the sending by such a
method is considered valid service in Japan; it merely indicates
that Japan does not consider it as [an] infringement of its sover-
eign power."'
This statement does little to clarify Japan's position on arti-
cle 10(a). A foreign plaintiff effecting service of process by mail
in Japan does so at the risk of having such service challenged as
invalid. However, article 13 of the Convention proscribes a state
138. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. SECOND SPECIAL COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 45, at 1556.
139. Id.
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from refusing to comply with a service method authorized under
the terms of the Convention, unless the state would deem such
compliance an infringement of its sovereignty or security. 42 In
light of Japan's express statement that it does not consider mail
service of process an infringement of its sovereignty, a foreign
plaintiff has some ammunition should its service by mail be
challenged. Furthermore, as previously noted, a state cannot ad-
vance internal law restrictions to justify its failure to fulfill in-
ternational obligations; therefore, Japan's failure to object out-
right to article 10(a) imposes upon it the duty to comply with its
obligations arising under article 10(a). 143
V. Conclusion
The intended meaning of article 10(a) was clarified at a
Special Commission meeting in 1977; nevertheless, over a decade
of litigation has ensued concerning its interpretation. The fact
that a source of clarification exists but has not been utilized
casts a poor light on the functioning of the judiciary and the
legal profession. More regrettable, however, is the effect this
past decade of litigation has had on the Convention. It has done
much to undermine not only the cooperative spirit with which
the Convention was drafted and implemented, but also the effi-
cacy of the Convention itself.
With the advent of open market economies in the Soviet
Union and Europe, treaties among various states are sure to in-
crease. To avoid repetitions of such misinterpretations, states
must agree to abide by liberal constructions of treaties that evi-
dence their accord. Courts and counsel must learn to probe
deeply to divine the meaning of treaties but at the same time
tread carefully in those areas of the law that transcend national
borders.
Patricia N. McCausland*
142. See supra note 22.
143. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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